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Strongly Resilient Non-Interactive Key
Predistribution For Hierarchical Networks
Hao Chen
Abstract—Key establishment is the basic necessary tool in the
network security, by which pairs in the network can establish
shared keys for protecting their pairwise communications.
There have been some key agreement or predistribution
schemes with the property that the key can be established
without the interaction ([3], [4], [19]). Recently the hierarchical
cryptography and the key management for hierarchical networks
have been active topics(see [5], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. ). Key
agreement schemes for hierarchical networks were presented
in [17], [13] which is based on the Blom key predistribution
scheme(Blom KPS, [1]) and pairing. In this paper we introduce
generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes.
These generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes
have the same security functionality as the Blom-Blundo et
al KPS. However different and random these KPSs can be
used for various parts of the networks for enhancing the
resilience. We also present key predistribution schemes from a
family hyperelliptic curves. These key predistribution schemes
from different random curves can be used for various parts
of hierarchical networks. Then the non-interactive, identity-
based and dynamic key predistributon scheme based on this
generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPSs and hyperelliptic curve
KPSs for hierarchical networks with the following properties
are constructed.
1)O(AKU) storage at each node in the network where U is the
expansion number and AK is the number of nodes at the K-th
level of the hierarchical network;
2)Strongly resilience to the compromising of arbitrary many
leaf and internal nodes;
3)Information theoretical security without random oracle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Key establishment is basic tool for secure communication
in networks, two nodes in networks can have agreed shared
key that is only known to them, thus allowing the shared key
for protecting their communications. In many environment
there is significant advantage to non-interactive key agreement
schemes which need not to use any communication between
nodes. The Diffie-Hellman type key agreement protocol(see
[1]) is non-interactive, but some known public keys are
needed which is a impractical for large networks. Recently
key agreement using key predistribution schemes have been
presented for very large networks such as, hierarchical
networks and wireless sensor networks([12], [7], [17], [11],
[13], [2]).
The key predistribution scheme(KPS) was proposed by
R.Blom in Eurocrypt 84 ([3]). It was extended by C. Blundo
et al in Crypto 92 [4]. This cryptographic primitive has
been a basic ingredient in the security of wireless sensor
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networks(see [10], [11]) and hierarchical systems(see [17],
[13]). However in the Blom and Blundo et al KPS, the size
of the finite field in the KPS has to be larger than the number
of users. The unique form of Blom-Blundo et al KPS has no
flexibility in practical application. These are real drawbacks.
In a HIERARCHICAL networks with n nodes, the root
authority only needs to distribute the secret information to
a small number of large organizations or group leaders, and
then each of these can further distribute the secret information
to smaller and smaller units(see [17], [13]). In this way
we can think the nodes are arranged on a tree, the root of
tree distributes the secret information of its children nodes
and then each of these distributes secret information to its
children nodes... each node only get its secret information
from its parent node. Finally the leaf nodes get their secret
information from their parent nodes. Each pair of nodes at
the same level (including the leaf nodes and internal nodes)
can compute their shared key by the secret information and
the identities of themselves and their parents. This would
help for group level authentication and confidentiality in the
whole hierarchical network. The expansion number U is the
maximal number of children nodes.
In the application such as tactical networks, mobile ad-hoc
networks, it is more reasonable to assume a Hierarchical
network structure than a central trusted authority (see [17],
[18], [13]). On the other hand, the using of Hierarchical
network structure can reduce the workload of of the TAs. The
Hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) was studied in
[16], [14], [5]. In [6], HIBE was used for the construction of
forward secure encryption. The hierarchical key agreement
has been studied in [17], [13].
In previous constructed key agreement schemes in [17] and
[13], every node in the hierarchical network needs the storage
of
∏
(ti+1)(ti+2)
2 elements of the base field for resisting the
compromising of ti nodes at i-th level of the hierarchical
networks. It will grows exponentially when the number of
levels in the hierarchical network tends to the infinity. The
KAS in [13] can only resist the attack of compromising
arbitrary many leaf nodes. The security of KAS in [13]was
proved with the random oracle model. The identity based key
agreement scheme of [13] is dynamic, nodes can be added at
each level of the hierarchy without changing the information
of other nodes.
In this paper we construct generalized Blom-Blundo
2et al key predistribution schemes and key predistribution
schemes from a family of hyperelliptic curves. New random
polynomials are introduced in the functions computing
shared keys in these generalized Blom-Blundo et al key
predistribution schemes. Hyerelliptic curve KPSs are
constructed from different random curves. These new
randomness and flexibility of our key predistribution
schemes can be used to construct strongly resilient key
predistribution schemes for hierarchical networks with low
storage, communication and computation cost. The size
of the base field of our new key predistribution schemes
depends only on the expansion number U of the hierarchical
network and the storage of every node is O(AKU), where
AK is the number of nodes at K-th level of the hierarchical
network. Moreover the constructed hierarchical network key
predistribution schemes are dynamic and non-interactive. Our
key predistribution schemes for hierarchical networks can
resist the compromising of arbitrary many of nodes with very
low storage at every node.
II. BLOM-BLUNDO ET AL KPS
Now we recall the definition of KPS by following the
presentation in the paper of Stinson [19]. Suppose we have
a Trusted Authority (TA) and a set of users U = {1, ..., n}.
Let 2U be the set of all subsets of the user set U. P ⊂ 2U
will denote the collection of all privileged subsets to which
the TA is distributing keys. F will denote the collection of
all possible coalitions(forbidden subsets) against which each
key is remain secure. In the Key Predistribution Scheme,
at the set up stage, each user i get its secret information
ui from the TA, where ui is taken in a finite dimensional
linear space over GF (q). Once the secret information ui,
i = 1, ..., n , is given to each user, in the computation stage,
for any privileged subset T ∈ P, the users in the privileged
subset T can compute the shared key kT ∈ GF (q) for their
communications. No forbidden subset J ∈ F disjoint from
T can get any information of the key kT . This is called
(P,F)-KPS. When P consists of all subsets of U with t
elements and F consists of subsets with at most w elements,
we call it t-variable and w-secure KPS. Thus a t-variable and
w-secure KPS can be used to get the shared keys of any subset
with t users, which is secure against the attack of any w users.
Generally the KPS is required information theoretically
secure against the attack of the coalition of users, for the
more formal presentation we refer to [3], [4], [19].
The secret information ui, i = 1, ..., n, is in the finite
dimensional linear space over the finite field GF (q)h, where
q is a prime power. Thus the storage is hlog2(q) bits. The
shared key kT , for each privileged subset T ∈ P, is in
GF (q). In the computation stage, each user i in T computes
kT from its secret information ui and the IDs of other users
in the set T . Only the arithmetic in GF (q) is involved. We
call GF (q) the base field of the KPS.
The first KPS proposed in [3] is a 2-variable and
w-secure KPS, and it was generalized in [4] to a t-
variable and w-secure KPS. Let q be a prime power
satisfying q ≥ n. Each user i is assigned to an element
ei ∈ GF (q) as its identity. The TA takes a random t
variable symmetric polynomial in GF (q)[x1, ..., xt] of the
form f(x1, ..., xt) = Σw+1j1=1 · · ·Σ
w+1
jt=1
aj1···jtx
j1
1 · · ·x
jt
t with
coefficients aj1···jt in GF (q) where aj1...jt = aji1 ...jit ,
that is, f(x1, ..., xt) = Σw+1j1=1 · · ·Σ
w+1
jt=1
aj1···jtx
j1
1 · · ·x
jt
t ∈
GF (q)[x1, ..., xt] and f(x1, ..., xt) = f(xi1 , ..., xit)(
{i1, ..., it} is an arbitrary permutation of {1, ..., t}). This
polynomial is only known to the TA. The symmetric
(t − 1) polynomial f(ei, x2, ..., xt) is given to the user i,
i = 1, ..., n, as its secret information. For any privileged
subset T = {ei1 , ..., eit}, each user in this subset T can
compute the shared key kT = f(ei1 , ..., eit).
In the case t = 2, this is just the KPS in [3]. The bit length
of secret information stored by each user in Blom-Blundo et
al KPS is
(
w + t− 1
t− 1
)
· log2(q).
III. GENERALIZED BLOM-BLUNDO ET AL KEY
PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
In this section we present the generalized 2-variable and
w-secure Blom-Blundo et al KPS, which can be extended
easily to t-variable and w-secure KPS.
Let GF (q) be a fixed finite field, there are at least q
t−Σd|tq
d
t
distinct degree t irreducible polynomials in GF (q)[x] Set
P (x) = p1(x) · · · ph(x), where pi’s are degree t irreducible
polynomial in GF (q)[x]. This is a degree H = ht polynomial
in GF (q)[x] which is not zero at any element in GF (q).
Set u(x) = f(x)P (x) , where f(x) is a degree w polynomial.
Because P (x) 6= 0 for any x ∈ GF (q), thus u(x) is defined
for any x ∈ GF (q). Let u1 = f1P , ..., uw+1 =
fw+1
P , where
f1, ..., fw+1 is a base of the linear space of all polynomials
in GF (q)[x] with degree less than or equal to w, be a
base of the linear space of all these functions, for example
u1(x) =
1
P (x) , u2(x) =
x
P (x) , ..., uw+1(x) =
xw
P (x) .
Suppose H ≥ w the 2-variable and w-secure KPS
associated with P (x) on the set of q users defined over
GF (q) can be constructed as follows. The elements in
GF (q) are assigned to the users as their IDs. The TA
takes a random F (P,Q) = Σw+1i=1,j=1aijui(P )uj(Q), where
aij = aji(then F (P,Q) = F (Q,P )) where P,Q ∈ GF (q).
The function F (P = ei, Q), as a function of Q, where
ei ∈ GF (q), can be given to the user ei as its secret
information. The shared key of the users with IDs ei and
ej is F (P = ei, Q = ej). The bit length of the secret
information stored by each user is (H + w + 2)log2(q).
Here (H+1)log2q bits are used to store the polynomial P (x).
Theorem 1. Suppose H ≥ w the above KPS is w-secure.
3Proof. We take the matrix of w + 1 rows and q columns
with the entry at i row and j column is ui(xj), where xj is the
j-th element in GF (q). This is actually a rank w + 1 matrix.
Actually any linear combination of w + 1 rows v1, ...,vw+1
of this matrix can not be zero at more than w positions, since
the function c1u1 + · · · + cw+1uw+1 = c1f1+···+cw+1fw+1P
cannot have more than w zero points. Then the w-security of
the above KPS follows from the same argument as in [1].
The functions in the generalized Blom-Blundo et al
KPSs have poles at the extension fields of GF (q). If the
polynomials P ’s are distinct, these poles are distinct elements
in the extension fields. Thus it is impossible for these
functions in KPS(Prandom)’s have an monic polynomial
relation. That is, it is impossible to express the symmetric
function used in one generalized Blom Blundo et al KPS as
the polynomials of symmetric functions of other different
generalized Blom Blundo et al KPSs.
The t-variable version of the generalized Bom-Blundo
et al KPSs will not be used in the hierarchical network
key predistribution schemes given in section V. We include
the construction here for the convenience of the readers.
The t-variable and w-secure generalized Blom-Blundo et
al KPS associated with P (x) on the set of q users defined
over GF (q) can be constructed as follows. The elements in
GF (q) are assigned to the users as their IDs. The TA takes a
random F (P1, ..., Pt) = Σi1···itai1···itui1(P1)× · · ·×uit(Pt),
where ai1···it are symmetric about its subindices (then F is
symmetric about its variables) where P1, ..., Pt ∈ GF (q).
The t − 1 variable function F (P=x, P2, ..., Pt) can be given
to the user with ID = x as its secret information. The shared
key of the t users with IDs e1, ..., et is F (e1, ..., et). The
bit length of the secret information stored by each user is(
t+ w − 1
t− 1
)
log2(q)+ (H +1)log2q. Here (H +1)log2q bits
are used for the storage of the polynomial P (x).
The proof of the w-security of this t-variable KPS is
directly since any w+1 columns of the matrix in Theorem 1
are linearly independent.
Then how many different such KPSs can we have? We
know there are at least BH = Σt|H(
qt−Σd|tq
d
t )
H
t polynomials
P (x) from the above argument corresponding to at least
B such KPSs. When w is a prime number BH = q
H−q
H .
This is quite large when both q and H satisfying q > H
tends to the infinity. Thus there are sufficiently such different
KPS(P )’s for the randomness we need in the design of KPS
for the wireless sensor networks. Generally this number can
be computed by zeta functions associated with the rational
curve(see [16]).
When f1 = 1, ..., fw+1 = xw in the above
generalized 2-variable and w-secure KPS, we
have the shared key is computed by the function
Σwi=0,j=0, aij
xi
P (x)
yj
P (y) =
Σwi,j=0aijx
iyj
P (x)P (y) . There are at
least BH = Σt|H(
qt−Σd|tq
d
t )
H
t possible polynomials
P (x) ∈ GF (q)[x] in the computation of the shared keys.
Hence the shared keys can be adjusted by these polynomials.
So the randomness we needed in the design of KPS comes
from these polynomials P ∈ GF (q)[x].
How can we use these irreducible polynomials in the
implementation of the generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPSs?
From the theory of finite fields, there are an enumeration of
irreducible polynomials of arbitrary fixed degree. For these
low degrees, some tables of irreducible polynomials over
GF (2) and GF (3) were listed in the standard textbooks
of finite fields. It can be used for the implementation of
generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPSs for which we take
h = wt large positive integer and t small positive integer.
Example 1. Let p(x) = 1 + 2x + x3 ∈ GF (9)[x]. It is
to check p(x) is an irreducible polynomial in GF (3)[x] and
thus irreducible in GF (9)[x], since the root is in GF (27)
and the intersection of GF (9) and GF (27) is GF (3). Set
f1(x) =
1
p(x) , f2(x) =
x
p(x) , f3(x) =
x2
p(x) , f4(x) =
x3
p(x) .
We can have a 2-variable and 3-secure KPS(p)
on the set of 9 players by taking random function
F (x, y) = Σ4i=1,j=1aijfifj = Σ
3
i=0,j=0aij
xi
p(x)
yj
p(y) , where
aij = aji are random elements in GF (9).
Example 2. Let p(x) = x7 + x + 1 ∈ GF (2)[x].
This is an irreducible polynomial in GF (2)[x]. It is
easy to check p(x) is also irreducible in GF (211)[x],
otherwise the intersection of GF (128) and GF (211) is
bigger than GF (2). If 7h ≤ 211 = 2048, the functions
f1 =
1
p(x)h
, f2 =
x
p(x)h
, ..., f7h =
x7h
p(x)h
can be used to get
a 2-variable and 7h-secure generalized Blom-Blundo et al
KPS. The setup server takes a random symmetric function
F (x, y) = Σ7hi=0aij
xi
p(x)h
· y
j
p(x)h
where aij = aji are random
elements in GF (211). The setup server then predistributes
F (ei, y) to the sensor node with ID = e ∈ GF (211) as
its secret information. The shared key of two sensor nodes
with IDs e, e′ ∈ GF (210) is F (e, e′). This generalized
Blom-Blundo KPS can be used for at most 211 = 1024 sensor
nodes. Since 7 is a prime number 27−27 = 18, we have at least
18 distinct degree 7 irreducible polynomials in GF (2)[x].
These polynomials are also irreducible in GF (211)[x]. If
7h ≤ 2048, we can have at least (18h distinct 2-variable
and 7h-secure KPSs on the set of 2048 sensor nodes. All
these distinct KPSs have the same security functionality as
2-variable and 7h-secure Blom-Blundo et al KPS. Thus these
distinct generalized Blom-Blundo et al KPSs can be used for
the various parts of the wireless sensor networks.
The generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution
schemes can be used for disigning strongly resilient wireless
sensor networks KPSs(see [8]).
4IV. RANDOM KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES FROM
HYPERELLIPTIC CURVES
A. Key predistribution schemes from a family of hyperelliptic
curves
Let q be an odd prime power, Xa be the hyperelliptic curve
y2 = xq + q + a defined over GF (q2), where a ∈ GF (q)
is an arbitrary element in GF (q) ⊂ GF (q2). The genus
of this curve is q−12 (see [14]). For each x ∈ GF (q2),
xq + x = TrGF (q2)/GF (q)(x) is an element in GF (q). Thus
xq + x + a ∈ GF (q). It is easy to show that each element
in GF (q) ⊂ GF (q2) is a square element, thus we have
2q2 affine GF (q2) rational points on Xa, and one GF (q2)
rational point Q at the infinity. x has a 2-th pole at the
point Q and y has a q-th pole at the infinity. Let L(uQ)
be the linear space of rational functions on the hyperelliptic
curve with only pole at the point Q and the pole order
not bigger than u. It is known that {xiyj |2i + qj ≤ u},
under the reduction y2 = xq + x + a, is a base of the
function space L(uQ) if u ≥ 2g − 1 = q − 2, which is a
u− g + 1 dimensional space over GF (q). For example when
u = 2q, then {1, x, ..., x
q+1
2 , y, yx, ..., yx
q−1
2 } is a base of
L((2q)Q)(see [14]).
Suppose q ≥ 5. We have a key predistribution scheme over
GF (q2) on the set of 2q2 users, the TA can take Xa for
a random a ∈ GF (q) and a random function F (P1, P2) =
Σ
w+ q+12
i,j=1 aijfi(P1)fj(P2) ∈ L((w+q−1)Q)⊗L((w+q−1)Q),
where (P1, P2) ∈ Xa × Xa. Here aij is symmetric about i
and j, f1, ..., fw+ q+12 is a base of L((w + q − 1)Q) of the
form xh1yh2 . Then F (P1 = W,P2) ∈ L((w + q − 1)Q) is
given to the user with the ID = W as its secret information.
For the users with ID = W and ID = W ′, the shared key
between them is F (W,W ′) ∈ GF (q2). It is clear that in this
(2, w) KPS over GF (q2) on the set of 2q2 users the storage
of secret information of each user is 2(w + q−12 )log2(q) bits.
Theorem 2. The above key predistribution scheme is
w-secure.
Proof. We consider the (w + q+12 ) × (2q
2) matrix by
evaluating the w + q+12 base functions of L((w + q − 1)Q)
at the 2q2 points described as above. This is actually the
generator matrix of the algebraic geometric code(see [14]). It
is well-known the minimum Hamming distance of the dual
code is at least w+2(see [14]). Thus any w+1 columns of the
above matrix are linear independent vectors in GF (q2)w+
q+1
2
.
From the construction of Blom key predistribution scheme in
[1](also see [11] pages 236-237), the above construction is a
w-secure key predistribution scheme on 2q2 users.
In this family of key predistribution schemes KPS(a)
on the set of 2q2 users, where a is the parameter of curve
equation, the shared keys are computed in a field with q2
elements. The randomness of of these KPSs are from random
curves instead of polynomials in the generalized Blom KPSs.
Though we need not to use the t-variable case in section V
for the key predistribution schemes of hierarchical networks
the construction is included here for the convenience of the
readers. The above 2-variable and w-secure KPS can be
extended to t-variable and w-secure KPS as follows. the TA
can take Xa for a random a ∈ GF (q) and a random function
F (P1, , ..., Pt) = Σ
w+ q+12
i1...it=1
ai1...itfi1(P1) × · · · × fit(Pit) ∈
L((w + q − 1)Q) ⊗ · · · ⊗ L((w + q − 1)Q), where
(Pi1 , ..., Pit) ∈ Xa × · · · ×Xa. Here ai1...it = aj1..jt , where
j1...jt is an arbitrary permutation of i1...it, and f1, ..., fw+ q+12
is a base of L((w + q − 1)Q) of the form xh1yh2 . Then
F (Pi1 = W,Pi2 , ..., Pit) of t − 1 variables is given to the
user with the ID = W as its secret information. For the users
with ID1 = W1, ..., IDt = Wt, the shared key for them is
F (W1, ...Wt) ∈ GF (q
2). It can be proved similarly as above
that this t-variable and w-secure KPS over GF (q2) on the set
of 2q2 users. The storage of secret information of each user
is 2
(
t+ w + q−32
t− 1
)
log2(q) bits. The detailed construction
and the proof will be included in our future paper [9].
B. Implementation
In the key predistribution schemes from hyperelliptic
curve Xa where a can take any element in GF (q), the TA
can assign the coordinates of the GF (q) rational points of
the hyperelliptic curve Xa, a ∈ GF (q) to the 2q2 users
as their IDs. Then the TA can fix a base of the function
space L((w + q − 1)Q) as above. The process of these key
predistribution schemes is the same as in Blom KPS, the only
difference is the polynomials and the elements of the finite
field are replaced by rational functions in L((w+q−1)Q) and
GF (q2) rational points of the curve. It should be noted that
the same monimial base as above can be used for arbitrary
curve Xa, a ∈ GF (q), in the process of the computation
of the shared keys, the reduction used on the curve Xa is
y2 = xq + x + a. The parameter a playes the critical role in
the computation of shared keys in the hyperelliptic curve key
preditribution schemes. Here (w + q+12 )log2(q) bits of secret
information need to be stored by each user.
V. STRONGLY RESILIENT KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
FOR HIERARCHICAL NETWORKS
Let R be the root authority, it has at most A1 children nodes
R1,...,RA1 , each Ri has A(i) children nodes, Ri1...RiA(i) .
A2 = ΣA(i) is number of all nodes at the 3rd level. We
assume the hierarchical system has L+ 1 levels. The node at
the K level is denoted by Ri1i2..iK−1 , which has A(i1i2...iK−1)
children nodes. Here ij is its number at the j-th level. Let
AK = ΣA(i1i2...ıK−1) is the number of all nodes at the
K + 1-th level. We assume A(i1...iK) ≤ U for any possible
subindices, that is, for each node, it has at most U children
nodes. U is called the expansion number.
5A. Generalized Blom-Blundo et al key predistribution schemes
for hierarchical networks
We fix a prime power q ≥ 2U and a positive integer t such
that q
t−Σd|tq
d
t ≥ q and 2U − 1 = th for some positive integer
h. We consider the q irreducible polynomials of degree t
P1, ..., Pq ∈ GF (q)[x] and a one-to-one correspondence
between Pα1 , ..., Pαq and the elements α1, ..., αq of GF (q)
will be used. For any parent node Ri1...iK−2 at the K − 1-
th level, each child node Ri1...iK−2j at the K level is
assigned an element in GF (q) as its ID. There are at least
(
qt−Σd|tq
d
t )
h > q different (2, 2U − 2) curve-KPS on the set
of 2U users defined over GF (q). The KPS associated with
the polynomial P hαi is denoted by KPS(Pαi)
The root authority R uses the random KPS(Ps), where s
is a random element in GF (q), to give the secret information
to each of its child node Ri, where i ≤ A1. The bit length
of the secret information is 2(U − 1)log2(q). For each node
Ri at the 2nd level, Ri randomly picks up KPS(Psi),
where si ∈ GF (q) is random element in GF (q), to give
each of its child node the secret information. For any
two Ri1j1 and Ri2j2 at the 3rd level, Ri1 and Ri2 at the
2nd level can have a shared key si1i2 in GF (q) from the
KPS(Ps), then Ri1 and Ri2 use KPS(Psi1i2 ) to give secret
information to their children nodes Ri1j’s and Ri2j’s. When
Rij1 and Rij2 want to find their shared key, they can use
KPS(Psi , and when Ri1j1 and Ri2j2 want to find their
shared key, they can use KPS(Psi1i2 ). This process can
proceed to all the levels. That is, Ri1...iw randomly picks up
KPS(Psi1...iw ) for the shared key among its children nodes,
and Ri1...iw and Ri′1...i′w use their shared key si1i′1...iwi′w
to fix a KPS(Psi1i′1...iwi′w ), then this KPS is used for the
shared key between the children nodes of Ri1...iw and Ri′1...i′w .
The bit length stored in each node at the K + 1-th level is
2AK(2U − 1)log2(q) and the computation of the shared key
is mainly the (2U − 1) times of multiplications of the finite
field GF (q).
B. Hyperelliptic curve key predistribution schemes for hierar-
chical networks
We denote the generalized (2, 2U − 2) curve-KPS on
the set of 2U ≤ 2q2 users defined over GF (q2) from the
hyperellptic curve X : y2 = xq + x + a as in section 3.1
as KPS(a) with parameter a from the finite field GF (q).
We take a finite field GF (q2) satisfying 2U ≤ 2q2. The
root authority R uses the random KPS(a), that is a is
randomly picked up from the finite field GF (q), to give
the secret information to each of its child node Ri. The bit
length of the secret information is 2(2U + q−32 )log2(q
2).
For each node Ri at the 2nd level, Ri randomly picks up
KPS(Pai), where ai ∈ GF (q), to give each of its child
node the secret information. For any two Ri1j1 and Ri2j2
at the 3rd level, Ri1 and Ri2 at the 2nd level can have a
shared key si1i2 in GF (q2) from the KPS(a), then Ri1
and Ri2 use KPS(Psq+1
i1i2
), to give secret information to
their children nodes Ri1j’s and Ri2j’s. It should be noted
s
q+1
i1i2
∈ GF (q) since si1i2 ∈ GF (q2). When Rij1 and Rij2
want to find their shared key, they can use KPS(Pai , and
when Ri1j1 and Ri2j2 want to find their shared key, they can
use KPS(Psq+1
i1i2
). This process can proceed to all the levels.
That is, Ri1...iw randomly picks up KPS(Psi1...iw ) , where
si1...iw ∈ GF (q), for the shared key among its children nodes.
The nodes Ri1...iw and Ri′1...i′w use their shared key si1i′1...iwi′w
to fix a KPS(Psq+1
i1i
′
1
...iwi
′
w
), then this KPS is used for the
shared key between the children nodes of Ri1...iw and Ri′1...i′w .
The field size in this hyperelliptic curve-KAS for the
hierarchical system has to satisfy q2 ≥ U2 , which is much
weaker than the previous KAS.
The bit length of the secret information stored in each
node at the K +1-th level is 2AK(2U + q−32 )log2(q
2) and at
most 4U + q− 3 times of multiplications of the field GF (q2)
are used for computing the shared key.
C. Key predistribution schemes for dynamic hierarchical net-
works
In the above hierarchical KAS, when q ≥ 2A(i1...iK−1) is
valid in genus 0 KPS and q2 ≥ A(i1...iK−1) in hyperelliptic
curve KPS, nodes can be added by the parent node Ri1...iK−1
to the hierarchy. That is, if we choose q with suitable large size,
the hierarchical nodes can added by the parent node without
change the settings of other nodes.
VI. INFORMATION THEORETICAL SECURITY
Because the number of children nodes of each node
A(i1i2...iK) ≤ U and we use (2, 2U − 2) KPS, the adversary
compromising less than 2U nodes cannot get the full
information of the KPS used, if the adversary compromise all
children nodes (at the K +1-th level) of the nodes Ri1...iK−1
and Ri′1...i′K−1 , the KPS used can be deleted and all the
children nodes in the further levels of the nodes Ri1...iK−1 and
Ri′
1
...i′
K−1
and themselves can be deleted without any impact
on the key agreement scheme of the other nodes, since we
use the RANDOM KPS associated with random polynomials
or from random curves for the key predistribution for the
un-compromised nodes and their children nodes. The point
here is, after deleting the compromising nodes, their children
nodes and their parent nodes, the secret information stored
in un-compromised nodes is random and the shared keys of
the un-compromised nodes are uniformly distrubited random
variables from the view of the compromised nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper the generalized Blom-Blundo eta la key
predistribution schemes and key predistribution schemes from
hyperelliptic curves have been constructed. This kind of
KPSs is flexible and can be used to construct hierarchical
6network key predistribution schemes. The size of shared keys
only depends on the expansion numbers of nodes. These
hierarchical network KPSs are identity based and dynamic.
They are more efficient than the previously known hierarchical
key agreement schemes and information theoretical secure
against the compromising of arbitrary many internal and leaf
nodes. The storage of each node is linear about the number
of nodes at each level.
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